Strategic Signals Series
The following reflects insights one could draw from recent global military developments, based on open-source intelligence and expert framing by the Babel Street Intelligence Solutions team. As events unfold, Babel Street rapidly synthesizes global signals into analysis-ready content for analysts and decision-makers who are navigating complex geopolitical terrains. This blog underscores the urgency of redefining intelligence approaches to understand the evolving landscape of adversarial logistics in the Americas.
As American warfare has evolved into the economic domain, it’s necessary to expand our definition of contested logistics. Contested logistics originated as a military concept. It acknowledges that global logistics — which are a foundational pillar of US warfare — are an attack surface for adversaries to impede US global military operations.[1] Houthi attacks against civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea are a classic example.[2] This expanded definition also frames a heightened “so what” for US military operations driven by US and adversarial economic policies. Tariffs, import and export restrictions, and sanctions directly shape global logistics and global supply chains, which in turn shape US military logistics.
Most global logistics occur by sea, so contested logistics carry a maritime connotation. But contested logistics involve many more threats than Houthis controlling a choke point that negates the open waterway at Suez. Contested logistics also infer adversarial logistics, and the use of logistics as means of access and placement to US interests. It’s not just maritime, and it’s not only nation-state adversaries. Contested logistics also encompass unregulated and undocumented logistics — trafficking, smuggling, money laundering, and systematic theft. We need to start thinking about criminal logistics as extensions of the logistics of nation-state adversaries of the US, its allies, and its partners. Adversarial and criminal logistics are part of the contested logistics problem.
The relationship between adversarial and criminal logistics is revealed in the Americas. Drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, and money laundering are lucrative criminal logistical enterprises. Their objective is profit, and their competitive edge is the ability to skirt law enforcement. As the kingpins, cartels take on many business partners, including Hezbollah in the Americas. Hezbollah has long used its American networks as a source of global funding. But as Hezbollah’s agenda responds to recent world events, we need to consider the other roles logistics can play for this designated terrorist organization. We need to consider that support zones can become attack zones.
Hezbollah has been active in the Americas for decades.[3] While lethal attacks have occurred, Hezbollah’s regional operation has largely been focused on generating funds. The Barakat Clan in Paraguay, the Saleh Clan in Colombia, the Rada Clan in Valencia, are just a few of the publicly known social and business nodes that have become ensconced within expat communities and partnered with cartels.[4]
Their primary support zone is the tri-border area between Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina. But Venezuela has become the anchor for Hezbollah and IRGC-QF due to the safe-haven and state resources garnered through the Chavez and Maduro regimes. Iran and Maduro’s 2022 strategic cooperation treaty for energy, finance, and “some defense projects,”[5] heralds another threat: alignment towards Iran over the US by other governments in the region, such as Bolivia.[6]
Hezbollah remains active in 2025. “Operation Trapiche” in November 2023 revealed Hezbollah plans to conduct attacks in Brazil against US targets and synagogues.[7] Rahmatullah Asadi Azizi, an Iranian national, was arrested in Peru in March 2024 for recruiting to attack an Israeli businessman.[8] Argentinian authorities announced in October 2024 that Husein Ahmad Karaki is the commander of Hezbollah in Latin America,[9] indicating both their attention to the threat and its persistence. Project Cassandra by the FBI, and DEA’s historical attention to Hezbollah’s global drug and money laundering networks[10] have a 2025 policy thrust: The “No Hezbollah in our Hemisphere Act” introduced in March 2025[11] echoes US focus on Hezbollah in the Americas in 2025. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is assessing Iran-related risks in Latin America and the Caribbean.[12]
Hezbollah and IRGC-QF have taken hits and had to react to global shifts. The patriarch of the IRGC-QF, Qasim Suleimani, was killed in Baghdad in 2020.[13] In 2024, a large swath of Hezbollah’s membership in Beirut was killed or maimed in a beeper-borne explosive network attack.[14] Hassan Nasrallah, the religious and political leader of Lebanese Hezbollah, was killed.[15] Iran and Hezbollah’s ally in Syria, Bashar al-Assad, lost the Syrian war and fled to Russia.[16]
Immediately after, Israel struck numerous military targets in Syria to deny them to all parties, including Hezbollah.[17] In June 2025, Iran’s nuclear facilities, air defense, and other facilities that likely housed IRGC-QF, were destroyed by Israeli and US attacks.[18] As we see from continued Houthi attacks in the Red Sea,[19] and a missile attack on the US command center at al-Udeid airbase,[20] this adversarial cabal is still lethal, and it is entrenched much closer to the US homeland.
We need to ask ourselves some tough contested logistics questions: Will Hezbollah and IRGC-QF convert any portion of their support zone in the Americas into an attack zone against American, allied, or partner interests? How will Hezbollah, among other actors, shift their regional operations given reduced access to US borders by land? Will Hezbollah expand its support zones in Argentina, Bolivia, and the Caribbean? What conditions will cause it to succeed or fail in its expansion? Moreover, we need to ask ourselves how our nation-state adversaries will view Hezbollah and IRGC-QF’s penetration in the Americas as a resource.
Contested logistics are also about avenues of approach and illicit economies that are vital to US national interest, and that of our allies and partners. Babel Street OSINT solutions can enable active monitoring of Hezbollah’s operations in the Americas.
End notes
1. Reece, Beth, Defense Logistics Agency, “Contested logistics white paper: DLA must adapt sustainment methods now,” Nov 21, 2024 https://www.dla.mil/About-DLA/News/News-Article-View/Article/3835749/contested-logistics-white-paper-dla-must-adapt-sustainment-methods-now/
2. Faucon, Benoit and Seligman, Lara, MSN, “Two Ships Desperately Tried to Fight Off Houthi Attacks. Help Never Arrived.” July 10, 2025 https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/two-ships-desperately-tried-to-fight-off-houthi-attacks-help-never-arrived/ar-AA1Imkzl?ocid=entnewsntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=499b253e5fc642cb97a04baf5abd6583&ei=15
3. Nielsen, Sarah, Wilson Center, “Fighting Terror in the Tri-Border Area,” Dec 9, 2019 https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/fighting-terror-the-tri-border-area#:~:text=An%20example%20that%20showcases%20the,from%2016%20OAS%20member%20states
4. Herrera, Ximena, Iranwire, “Venezuela's Clans Usher Hezbollah in Through the Front Door,” Feb 15, 2021 https://iranwire.com/en/features/68940/#:~:text=The%20Saleh%20clan%20operated%20mainly,Office%20of%20Foreign%20Assets%20Control
5. Reuters, “Under U.S. sanctions, Iran and Venezuela sign 20-year cooperation plan,” June 12, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/iran-venezuela-sign-20-year-cooperation-plan-state-tv-2022-06-11/
6. Politi, Daniel and Valdez, Carlos, AP, “Argentina demands that Bolivia explain its new defense agreement with Iran,” July 24, 2023 https://apnews.com/article/argentina-bolivia-iran-defense-mou-2cb8c5917fdb6d3e01af4c67af969797
7. Mackintosh, Thomas and Plummer, Robert, BBC News, “Suspects held over alleged Hezbollah plot in Brazil,” Nov 9, 2023 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-67367483
8. Schwartz, Jack, Jack Schwartz Reporting, “From Beirut to Bogotá: The Reach of Middle Eastern Terrorism in South America,” July 6, 2025 https://insurgencyreport.substack.com/p/from-beirut-to-bogota-the-reach-of
9. Humire, Joseph, Middle East Forum Online, “Argentina Reveals the Identity of Hezbollah’s Terrorist Leader in Latin America,” Oct 25, 2024 https://www.meforum.org/mef-online/argentina-reveals-the-identity-of-hezbollahs-terrorist-leader-in-latin-america
10. Congressional Record, “Project Cassandra,” Dec 20, 2017, https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/volume-163/issue-208/house-section/article/H10335-2
11. Jacky Rosen, U.S. Senator for Nevada, “Rosen, Curtis Bipartisan Bill to Counter Hezbollah’s Influence in the Western Hemisphere Passes Committee,” Apr 4, 2025 https://www.rosen.senate.gov/2025/04/04/rosen-curtis-bipartisan-bill-to-counter-hezbollahs-influence-in-the-western-hemisphere-passes-committee/
12. Financial Action Task Force, “What We Do,” Retrieved Jul 14, 2025 https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/the-fatf/what-we-do.html
13. Al Jazeera, “Iran vows to avenge Qassem Soleimani’s killing three years ago,” Jan 3, 2023 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/3/three-years-on-iran-vows-revenge-for-qassem-soleimani
14. Feng, Emily, NPR, “Tracking the exploding pagers used in apparent Israeli attack on Hezbollah,” Sep 18, 2024 https://www.npr.org/2024/09/18/g-s1-23547/tracking-the-exploding-pagers-used-in-attack-on-hezbollah
15. Young, Michael, Carnegie Endowment Diwan, “Israel Has Assassinated the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah,” Sep 29, 2024 https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2024/09/israel-has-assassinated-the-secretary-general-of-hezbollah-hassan-nasrallah?lang=en
16. Shaheen, Abdulrahman, Sewell, Abby and El Deeb, Sarah, AP, “Ousted Syrian leader Assad flees to Moscow after fall of Damascus, Russian state media say,” Dec 8, 2024 https://www.apnews.com/article/syria-assad-sweida-daraa-homs-hts-qatar-816e538565d1ae47e016b5765b044d31
17. Mackenzie, James and Al-Khalidi, Suleiman, Reuters, “Israel says its air strikes destroyed most of Syria's strategic weapons stockpiles,” Dec 10, 2024 https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-incursion-into-syria-reaches-25-km-southwest-damascus-security-sources-2024-12-10/
18. Davenport, Kelsey, Arms Control Association, “Israel and U.S. Strike Iran’s Nuclear Program,” July 2025, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-07/news/israel-and-us-strike-irans-nuclear-program
19. Faucon, Benoit and Seligman, Lara, MSN, “Two Ships Desperately Tried to Fight Off Houthi Attacks. Help Never Arrived.” July 10, 2025 https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/two-ships-desperately-tried-to-fight-off-houthi-attacks-help-never-arrived/ar-AA1Imkzl?ocid=entnewsntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=499b253e5fc642cb97a04baf5abd6583&ei=15
20. Gambrell, John, AP, “Iran’s attack on Qatar air base hit geodesic dome used for US communications, satellite photos show,” July 11, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/iran-qatar-udeid-air-base-attack-us-aace65a65a0ce69090a7b65fe85cfac8
Disclaimer
The views expressed in this brief are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Babel Street or any of its affiliated organizations. The opinions expressed are based on open-source intelligence and are intended for informational purposes only. It should not be construed as legal, strategic, or operational advice.